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Applying the theory of yardstick competition to the schooling system, we show that it is 
optimal to have central tests of student achievement and to engage in benchmarking because it 
raises the quality of teaching. This is true even if teachers’ pay (defined in monetary terms) is 
not performance related. If teachers value reputation, and if teaching output is measured so 
that it becomes comparable, teachers will increase their effort. The theory is tested using the 
German PISA-E data. Our estimates suggest that, despite the flat career profile of German 
teachers, the quality of teaching tends to be higher in federal states with central exams. 
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Teacher quality is viewed as one of the most important inputs in an education 
production function. Hence, there is a broad consensus that academic achievement of students 
can be raised if the quality of teachers improves. This insight at hand, politics is challenged to 
improve the incentives for teachers to perform. A number of countries have changed their 
schooling institutions or at least conducted large scale experiments to find out how to set the 
right incentives for teachers. 
One way to create incentives for teachers is performance related pay. However, the 
empirical evidence on the relationship between teacher salaries and teacher quality is 
surprisingly mixed. For example, Lavy (2002, 2003) finds evidence for positive incentive 
effects of both performance related salaries and performance related resources given to 
schools. Moreover, monetary incentives in form of teacher salaries are found to be more cost 
effective than awarding more resources to the teacher’s school. Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 
(1999), however, show that salaries and student performance are only weakly related. The 
composition of teachers within a school district appears to be more affected by characteristics 
of students than by salary schedules. Apart from tying teacher’s pay to the quality of teaching, 
higher quality could be enforced by stricter certification and licensing provisions. Angrist and 
Guryan (2003) show that this strategy can fail: the introduction of state-mandated teacher 
testing in the US has increased teacher wages with no corresponding increase in quality. 
Strengthening non-monetary incentives in the schooling system is yet another 
alternative. This could be simply done by setting common standards, testing students against 
this standard, and finally making the results public. Teachers will then be motivated to 
perform well in order to gain non-monetary rewards like reputation or acceptance among 
colleagues, parents, and students. 
In Section 2, we show in a theoretical model that it is optimal to let a teacher’s reward 
(with monetary and non-monetary components) depend on the absolute and relative 
performance of the teacher’s class. To measure performance as an indicator of teacher quality, 
common standards are needed and students have to be tested against these standards. 
Measuring the performance of a teacher’s class raises the effort put forth by teachers and 
hence also the academic performance of the students. It is argued that it is efficiency 
enhancing not only to measure student achievement but to make student test results 
comparable by controlling for the socio-economic background of the school or the students. 
Only intelligent benchmarking yields the maximal efficiency gains. Benchmarking in the 
school system is already practiced, for instance in the US state of California. Public schools 
  1are evaluated based on a so-called Academic Performance Index (API). Each school has to 
meet a target and is either rewarded for achieving the target or sanctioned for failing to reach 
the target. Schools are ranked according to their API value. They are ranked within schools of 
their type, but also, and this picks up the idea of benchmarking, schools are compared to 100 
other schools that are similar with respect to demographic characteristics (Similar Schools 
Rank). 
In the present paper, we use data from the German PISA-E study (PISA-extension) to 
estimate the effects of external standards on teacher quality. Two types of variables are used 
to measure teacher quality. First, we use subjective measures of teacher and school quality 
from the student and parents questionnaires. Second, we analyze student performance as 
measured by the PISA test score to estimate the effect of external standards on achievement. 
Estimating the causal effects of central exams is not straightforward, because it is 
typically decided on the country level whether to have or not to have central exams. Thus 
within a country there is hardly any variation in exam types which makes it difficult to 
estimate the effects of central standards using national data
1. Germany is an exception 
because, due to its federal structure, there has been a long standing tradition of testing against 
external standards at the end of secondary schooling in some federal states and of having no 
standardized tests in others
2. Hence the German schooling system is suitable to test for the 
effects of external standards on teacher quality measures and indirect measures like test scores 
in international tests. 
Jürges, Schneider and Büchel (2003) use data from TIMSS-Germany and estimate the 
effect of central exit exams (CEE) on test scores in Germany with a difference-in-difference 
estimator. The estimate is positive and significant but smaller than previous studies had 
suggested. While Jürges et al. (2003) estimate the effect to be at least one third of a school 
year equivalent using German data only, Wößmann (2002) uses the international TIMSS 
micro data and estimates the effect to be as much as about one school year equivalent. Here 
we present a complementary approach to estimate the effect of central standards, focusing on 
the quality of teachers. We use data from the PISA-E study to show that teachers' 
performance is in fact better when standards are enforced through central exit exams. In order 
to identify the causal effects, students in CEE-states and non-CEE states are matched on the 
                                                 
1Using international data, the effects could theoretically be estimated (Bishop 1997, 1999; Wößmann 2002) but 
the drawbacks are manifold (Jürges and Schneider, 2004; Jürges, Schneider and Büchel, 2003).  
2 However, as a result of the unsatisfactory performance of German students in international student achievement 
studies like PISA or TIMSS, standardized tests will be adopted in almost all of the remaining federal states in the 
near future. 
  2basis of the propensity score. The results support the predictions from the theoretical model. 
Teacher quality is higher in states with CEEs. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The theoretical argument is developed in Section 2. 
Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical model and the results, and 
in Section 5 we briefly summarize the main findings and conclude. 
 
2. The Model 
The theoretical literature almost unanimously argues that CEEs and hence central 
standards improve student performance and might even raise welfare (Costrell, 1997, Effinger 
and Polborn, 1999). Central exit examinations are purported to function better as incentives 
for students, teachers and schools than decentralized examinations (e.g. Bishop, 1997, 1999). 
Students, for example, benefit because the results of CEEs are more valuable as signals on the 
job market than the results of non-central examinations, simply because the former are better 
comparable. Furthermore, students who have to meet an external standard at the end of their 
school career have no incentive to establish a low-achievement cartel in class, possibly with 
the tacit consent of the teachers. Student test results can be used to monitor teacher and 
teaching quality on a regular basis. Whether incentives to improve teaching quality, arguably 
an important factor in the education production function, should come solely from reputation 
effects on the teacher or school level, or in form of higher pay for better teachers is open to 
discussion (Hanushek et al., 1999; Lavy, 2002, 2003; Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer, 2003). 
The following model describes how teachers determine effort and how a social planner 
chooses the components of the teacher’s reward to maximize a social welfare function. The 
basic idea is that the planner is interested in setting the right incentives for teachers to put 
forth effort, which is unobservable. The outcome of teaching, the academic achievement of 
students, reflects effort to some degree, but achievement is an imperfect measure of effort 
when classes are not homogenous with respect to their average ability. With heterogeneous 
classes the planner does not know for sure how much effort the teacher has invested. The 
literature on yardstick competition shows how a first-best level of welfare can be obtained by 
competing away the asymmetry of information (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). The 
following model is an application of yardstick competition to the schooling system. 
First consider the teachers decision on teaching effort. Each teacher is allocated to one 
class i. The index i thus uniquely identifies teachers and their classes. The average ability of 
students in class i is  i θ
~
 (the tilde denotes stochastic variables). Average ability of the students 
  3differs between classes, but we assume that there is no sorting of students by ability and that 
the average ability of the class is only known to the teacher but not to the planner. The 
planner could be the principal of the school, given that schools have autonomy , the 
community or the government. Let θ
~
 be the benchmark for  i θ
~
. One may think of the average 
ability of a particular class selected for comparison. Alternatively, θ
~
 could be the average 
ability of a set of classes against which  i θ
~
 is compared. Since average ability is stochastic and 
students are not sorted by ability we get  θ
~









cov( σ θ θ r i = , and 
r>0. The positive covariance between the ability of students in class i and the benchmark 
ensures that there is no systematic sorting of teachers and students. Thus low ability students 
cannot always be an excuse for the poor performance of teachers’ classes. This relationship is 
crucial for the argument. Only if the ability of students in a class and its benchmark are 
positively related, it is meaningful to compare academic achievement and to condition the 
teacher’s reward on the relative academic achievement of the students. 
Student achievement,  i a ~  (as measured in e.g. central exams or standardized tests like 
PISA) depends on the ability of the students and teacher’s effort,  . In particular we choose 
an additive structure 
i e
  i i i e
~
a ~ + =θ . 
The achievement of the benchmark is denoted by  e
~
a ~ + =θ . 
The teacher’s reward,  i W
~
, consists of a basic salary and a bonus that depends on the 
performance of the own class and also on the performance of the benchmark 
  a a W a a W i i i
~ ~ ) , (
~
δ α − + = , with  0 , ≥ δ α . 
Note that the bonus does not have to be a monetary bonus but could be reputation or 
recognition by students, parents or colleagues. Being in a school with a high reputation can be 
quite valuable for a teacher. Similarly, being assessed as a (relatively) bad teacher can cause 
disutility and might set strong incentives to improve by working harder. We choose the 
interpretation of  a ai
~ ~ δ α −  as non-monetary components of the teacher reward to apply the 
model to the German schooling system. Teacher’s pay in Germany is basically not related to 
performance but simply rises with the age of the teacher. Thus, the career profile of a German 
teacher is fairly flat. Nevertheless, some federal states decided to make the quality of teaching 
visible and hence comparable by testing students centrally, thereby allowing the reputation of 
a teacher to depend directly on the quality of the output: student achievement. 
  4The parameters α and δ are policy parameters in this model. If they assume strictly 
positive values, the teacher’s reward depends on the absolute and relative performance of her 
class. If only α  is positive, the reward depends on the performance of the own class only, but 
it is not feasible to compare the performance of the teacher’s own class to the performance of 
the benchmark. Positive values of δ  indicate that recognition depends also on the 
performance of the benchmark. Put differently, if my class performs well, I gain recognition. 
However, if the benchmark performs well, my results are worth less than if the benchmark 
performs poorly. If α and δ are both zero, teachers receive a basic, performance independent 
salary only. This is the case if performance is not measured and no benchmark exists against 
which to compare the achievement of the teacher or the students, respectively. Benchmarking 
requires a common standard for measuring achievement, which is enforced by means of 
central exams. 
In the following we show that a social planner would optimally choose positive values 
for both parameters, α and δ . The choice of some positive α is a direct means to elicit 
teacher’s effort. The choice of a positive value for δ is less obvious and needs to be proven. 
As we will show, δ is smaller than α in the optimum. However, it is larger the stronger the 
correlation of the average ability  i θ
~
 and the benchmark θ
~
. Thus benchmarking is socially 
desirable only to the extent to which comparability of abilities is given. 
Teachers derive utility from the expected reward, but utility also depends negatively 
on the work effort. Reward and effort have to be traded off. Moreover, if teachers are risk 
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  5The social planner decides on the policy parameters, i.e. the structure of the teacher 
reward. In decentralized systems, the social planner could be the principal of the school, in 
centralized systems it could be the ministry of education. The social planner maximizes a 
welfare function of the type 
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, i.e., the social planner is interested in the academic performance 
of the students but wants to keep the rewards low. Assuming additivity yields 
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The planner maximizes the welfare function by determining the optimal structure of teachers’ 
reward, respecting the participation constraint. Thus she 
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Partial differentiation with respect to W  yields  1 = λ . 
Using  1 = λ  in (2) gives 
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Differentiating (3) with respect to δ  yields 
  α δ r = , (4) 
and finally from the first-order condition with respect to α  we get 
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Note that  0 > α , whereas  0 > δ  only if   Hence it is always optimal to reward 
teachers according to the absolute performance of the class. However it is only optimal to 
reward teachers according to relative academic achievement if comparability can be ensured. 
The better the comparability as measured by a large value of r, the better the benchmark. In 
case of perfect correlation, r=1, the first best,  , is obtained. This raises the issue 
on how to choose the benchmark against which to compare the achievement of class i. 
. 0 > r
* 1 i e = = = α δ
  6Clearly, if θ
~
 is the average ability of all students in the country, θ
~
 is non-stochastic and r 
vanishes. As a result  0 = δ . The interpretation is that there is little gain in social welfare from 
benchmarking when comparability cannot be ensured. Vice versa, the more careful the 
benchmark is chosen with respect to for instance the comparability of the socio-economic 
background, the more efficient are the results. 
If r<1, it still pays to reward teachers according to absolute academic achievement, 
0 > α , however the first best is systematically failed. The reason is that teachers are assumed 
to be risk averse, and the social planner has to account for this as it affects the participation 
constraint. The more risk averse teachers are, or the larger the variance of students’ average 
ability, the more costly it is to reward teachers according to student achievement. 
To summarize the main results of the theoretical model: It is efficiency enhancing to 
let teachers’ reward depend on absolute and relative performance measures based on the 
academic achievement of students. The requirement for this is a standardized evaluation of 
student achievement in form of a central exam. Moreover, efficiency gains can be realized if 
the performance of classes as an indicator of teacher quality is evaluated relative to a good 
benchmark. This can be achieved by controlling for observables like the socio-economic 
background of students. In the following empirical part of the paper, we test whether teacher 
quality is in fact higher with central exams. 
 
3. The Data 
The data used in the empirical analysis is drawn from the German PISA-E data
3. The 
OECD-Program for International Student Assessment – PISA – aims to assess how much 
knowledge and skills students approaching the end of compulsory schooling have acquired in 
the basic fields of reading, mathematics, and science
4. A total of 32 countries participated in 
the first assessment in 2000 with the focus of the testing being on the reading literacy of 15 
year old students. In 2003 the major domain is mathematical literacy and in 2006 the focus is 
on scientific literacy. Each country tested between 4,500 and 10,000 students. In Germany, 
5,000 students from 219 schools participated in the first PISA test. 
                                                 
3 The data is available on the website of the German Kultusministerkonferenz (Ministries of education of the 
federal states) under http://www.kmk.org/. 
4 One argument against central tests is the possible tendency of teaching-to-the-test. Clearly, if the teachers know 
what students need to know when taking the test, they might be tempted to focus exclusively on exam relevant 
issues. Teaching-to-the-test could in fact be counterproductive. Our data, however, stems from the PISA-study 
and not from testing achievement based on a national curriculum. Thus teachers in Germany where not familiar 
with the test content, and, if teaching-to-the-test is a relevant problem at all, it should not affect the PISA results. 
  7In addition to the international version of PISA, Germany complemented PISA by a 
national extension, called PISA-E, which was conducted simultaneously with the PISA test. 
PISA-E is a study of 15 year old students and 9
th graders. The international test was 
supplemented by national test items and the sample size was increased from about 5,000 in 
the international test to two overlapping samples of 33,809 15 year old students and 33,744 9
th 
graders. The overlap is 47 percent. 
Since the information about the state of the student’s school is only available in the 
data of the 9
th graders, we are working with that part of the sample to assess the effect of 
CEEs on the quality of teaching. The published data has information on all 16 states but since 
the data on students in Berlin and Hamburg are not representative, they are excluded from the 
analysis. 
Before we discuss the practice of CEEs in Germany, we briefly describe the German 
school system in Figure 1
5. All children in Germany attend primary school, which covers 
grades 1 to 4, or in some states grades 1 to 6. There is no formal exit examination at the end 
of primary schooling. Rather, students are generally allocated to one of the three secondary 
school types on the basis of the primary school’s recommendation. If the primary school's 
recommendation conflicts with the parents' wishes, however, the final decision about the 
future course of education lies either with the parents, the secondary school, or the school 
supervisory authority, depending on the federal state. 
The Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium are the three main types of secondary 
school; each leads to a specific leaving certificate. The Hauptschule provides its students with 
basic general education, and usually comprises grades 5 to 9 (or 10 in some states). The 
Realschule provides a more extensive general education, usually comprising grades 5 to 10. 
The  Gymnasium  provides an in-depth general education covering both lower and upper 
secondary level, and usually comprises grades 5 to 13 (or 12 in states in eastern Germany). 
Depending on their academic performance, students can switch between school types. A 
fourth type of school is the Gesamtschule (comprehensive school). This type of secondary 
school offers all lower secondary level leaving certificates, as well as providing upper 
secondary education. It only plays a minor role in most federal states with less than 10 percent 
of all students attending a comprehensive school. 
                                                 
5 A detailed description of the German school system can be found in Jonen and Boene (2001). 
  8Vocational track (dual system) 
















































a Some Eastern German states integrate Haupt- and Realschule in a middle school. 
 




Table 1: Federal States with CEE by degree 
 Lower Secondary         Upper Secondary











 High school 
diploma 
(Abitur) 
Baden-Württemberg (BW)  +  +      +    + 
Bavaria (BY)  +  +      −    + 
Mecklenburg-W. Pomerania (MV)  −  +    +  −  +    +
Saarland (SA)  −  −    −  −  +    +
Saxony      +    −  +    +
Saxony-Anhalt (ST)      +    + −    + 
Thuringia (TH)      +        + −  + +
No CEEs in Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatine, and Schleswig-Holstein. Grey cells: 
school type does not exits; +: CEE; −: no CEE. 
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schooling systems are largely determined on the level of the federal states in Germany. One 
prominent example of state-specific institutions is the existence of external standards in form 
of central exit exams (CEE) that allow to compare the quality of teachers by comparing test 
results, i.e. the academic achievement of the students. 
Central exit examinations are most common at the end of upper-secondary education 
(see Table 1). In 2000, seven out of the sixteen German federal states had a central Abitur 
(high-school diploma) at the state level. These states are concentrated in the south (Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, Saarland) and east (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, 
Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia). The other states had decentralized systems, where teachers design 
problems for exit examinations individually subject to the approval of the school supervisory 
authority. Six states have central exit examinations at the end of Realschule and only four 
have them at the end of Hauptschule. 
This unique institutional variation allows to empirically test for the effects of central 
exit exams on the quality of teachers. However, estimating the effect of CEE is not 
straightforward for various reasons. Teacher’s effort or the quality of teaching is 
unobservable. PISA-E contains a large set of items that can be used to construct indices of 
teaching quality, which are not necessarily unrelated. Students evaluated their classes and 
teachers with respect to several dimensions such as achievement pressure, teacher support, 
disciplinary climate, clarity of instruction, excessive demands, and teachers' individual 
orientation. Parents were asked to evaluate teachers' demands and efforts, and their overall 
satisfaction with the school. In addition to these subjective indicators we also use student test 
results in PISA-E as a more objective indicator of teacher effort. Unlike in TIMSS, teachers 
were not interviewed in PISA-E, so that we have no self-assessed measures of teacher effort. 
The qualitative teacher variables are listed in Table 2. Here, we only mention the 
number of items used to construct the indices and their reliability (measured by Cronbach's 
α). Overall, the reliability of the indices is at acceptable to good levels. A detailed list of all 
items can be found in the Appendix. Here, we only give a short description: 
•  Achievement pressure measures the frequency with which teachers tell their students to 
work harder. 
•  Teacher support measures the frequency with which teachers help students when they 
have problems understanding. 
  10•  Bad disciplinary climate measures the frequency with which bad discipline among 
students undermines teaching. 
•  Clarity of instruction measures the frequency with which lessons and exercises are clearly 
structured. 
•  Excess demand measures the frequency with which students think that teachers ask too 
much of them. 
•  Individual orientation measures the frequency with which teachers commend below-
average students who make progress. 
 
Table 2: Indicators of teacher effort 
Mathematics German  General   
#  of  items alpha #  of  items alpha #  of  items alpha 
Students evaluations of             
achievement  pressure  3 .65 3 .58     
teacher  support  7 .90 6 .85     
bad disciplinary climate  6  .85  6  .80     
clarity of instruction  5  .65  5  .78     
excess  demand  4 .74 4 .73     
individual  orientation  3 .77 3 .85     
repetitive  exercises  2  .57      
innovative  exercises  3  .59      
Parents evaluations of             
school's  academic  level       1   
teachers'  efforts       1   
overall  satisfaction  with  school       1   
 
Students were asked to evaluate teachers in both mathematics and German classes. For 
mathematics classes, we have two additional indicators, the frequency of repetitive exercises 
and the frequency of innovative exercises (i.e. exercises that require to apply skills in 
changing contexts). Parents' evaluations are measured by answers to single questions on 
academic level, teachers' effort and overall satisfaction with the school. 
Besides the subjective judgements of students and parents we use PISA-E test results 
as a more objective indicator of teacher effort. Unfortunately, official test scores for 
individual students are not available in the public use data set. There are official test scores, to 
be precise, but they have been standardized by federal state, which makes any cross-state 
comparison impossible. However, we have information on whether a student answered a test 
item correctly or not for all administered items. It is not possible to reconstruct Rasch scores 
from this data, but we tried to circumvent this problem by constructing two simple scores
6. (1) 
The percentage of correct answers a student has given, (2) the weighted percentage of correct 
  11answers, where the weights reflect the difficulty of each question, and where the difficulty of 
each item is calculated as one minus the percentage of all students that answered the question 
correctly. 
Let  be an indicator variable that is 1 if student i answered question j correctly, and 


















where   denotes the test-book issued to student i (there was a total of 9 different test-
books per subject with overlapping sets of questions). The second score is calculated as: 
i J
































where   denotes the set of students that answered question j.  j I
In order to evaluate the relative performance of our score, we calculated intra-state 
correlations between the official Rasch scores and our scores. The correlations between the 
Rasch scores and S1 range from .75 to .79. Surprisingly, S2 (which takes difference in item 
difficulty into account) performs a bit worse with correlations between .73 and .78. 
Table 3 summarizes raw differences in student and parent-assessed teacher effort and 
student achievement between states with and without central exams. We have standardized all 
variables to mean zero and variance one, so that these differences can be interpreted in terms 
of standard errors. Note also that we report separate results for the sub-sample of lower 
secondary schools (Haupt- and Realschule). The students in this sub-sample take central 
exams at the end of lower secondary schooling, i.e., at the end of grade 9 or 10. We thus 
                                                                                                                                                          
6 We only use international test items. The German PISA-Extension also has tested students in mathematics and 
science using a “national” set of items. 
  12expect stronger effects of CEEs in these types of schools than in others, because the central 
exams are still three to four years in the future. 
 
Table 3: Differences between CEE and non-CEE states, weighted 
  Full Sample  Lower Secondary Schools 
Mathematics  mean CEE minus 
mean non-CEE 
t-value difference mean CEE minus 
mean non-CEE 
t-value difference
achievement  pressure  0.077 2.510* 0.058 2.146* 
teacher support  -0.028 -0.613 0.014  0.323 
bad disciplinary climate  -0.132  -2.476*  -0.144  -3.081** 
clarity of instruction  0.051  1.650  0.049  1.992* 
excess  demand  -0.020 -0.694 -0.032 -1.116 
individual  orientation  0.020 0.782 0.050 1.568 
repetitive  exercises  -0.112 -2.568* -0.121  -2.836** 
innovative  exercises  0.078 1.801+ 0.100  2.738** 
mathematics  score  1  0.162 1.185 0.147 1.233 
mathematics  score  2  0.151 1.129 0.132 1.274 
German         
achievement  pressure  0.045 0.901 0.027 0.746 
teacher support  -0.081  -1.573 -0.038 -0.670 
bad disciplinary climate  -0.051  -1.123  -0.076  -1.621 
clarity  -0.017 -0.500 -0.008 -0.282 
excess  demand  0.008 0.125 0.014 0.398 
individual orientation  -0.004  -0.195  0.013  0.399 
reading  score  1  0.146 0.882 0.145 0.941 
reading  score  2  0.135 0.813 0.129 0.901 
General         
school's academic level  0.281 4.819** 0.245 4.001** 
teachers' efforts  0.018 0.459 0.036 0.769 
overall satisfaction with school  0.065  1.761+  0.066  1.262 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01, t-values adjusted for clustering. 
 
One major problem in assessing the differences between CEE states and non-CEE 
states is the calculation of the standard errors. Since the data contains no school or class 
identifiers, we do not know which students belong to the same primary sampling unit and who 
are thus evaluating the same teacher. The only information we have is the state, the type of 
school and the track in dual-track or comprehensive schools. We used this information to 
create clusters, for which we corrected standard errors. It is very likely that these standard 
errors are too high (and t-values too low). 
The largest differences with respect to mathematics teachers can be found for 
achievement pressure, disciplinary climate, repetitiveness and innovation, and student test 
scores. All these differences have the expected sign: teachers in CEE states exert more 
pressure on their students to perform well, they create a more disciplined climate in class, 
exercises are less repetitive and have more variety. This results in – inter alii – better test 
scores in mathematics. Thus students in states with external standards outperform their peers 
in states without external standards. It turns out, that the differences in test scores are much 
  13smaller than those found in Jürges et al. (2003) for the German TIMSS middle school sample 
(where the raw difference in mathematics scores was 0.433 standard deviations). Moreover, 
the raw difference in test scores is most likely not an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of 
external standards. In Section 4 we discuss this issue in depth and propose an unbiased 
estimator. 
Two more things are worth noting: although lower secondary teachers in CEE states 
appear to give less support when students have trouble understanding, they seem to take more 
care of weaker students by appraising their progress more often. Interestingly, teachers are 
less often perceived as too demanding in CEE states. Contrary to our expectations, we find 
slightly smaller differences in lower secondary schools. 
With the exception of achievement pressure, the differences with respect to German 
teachers and lessons are qualitatively similar to those for mathematics teachers. Test scores 
are also higher in CEE states. 
The last three rows in Table 3 show differences in parental assessment of their 
children's schools and teachers. Parents in CEE states tend to think more often that the 
academic level of the school is too high. The differences in parents' evaluations of teacher 
effort are only small. This is somewhat at odds with their children’s judgment. Parents are 
perhaps not well informed about their children's teachers and what happens in their classes. 
Still, overall satisfaction with their children's school is higher in states that have CEEs. 
All differences presented so far are raw differences between schools with and without 
CEEs. The socio-economic background of the students varies between states and below, we 
will control for these variations. Table 4 describes these covariates variables by CEE status. A 
couple of differences are worthwhile mentioning. The first difference to note is that having 
external standards is very common in the East, a heritage of the former GDR's school system. 
About 40 percent of all students with CEEs are from East Germany, whereas only 9 percent 
of those without CEEs are from the East. Another difference between the two groups of 
federal states is that 15.8 percent of the students in non-CEE states do not speak German at 
home. The corresponding figure for the CEE states is only 9 percent. 
While in both types of states, about the same proportion of students visits the 
Gymnasium, there are large differences with respect to the other school types. Comprehensive 
schools play virtually no role in CEE states but 15 percent of the students in non-CEE states 
visit comprehensive schools. The educational background of the students is typically very 
important for their academic achievement. Here we measure educational background by the 
parents' formal education, the number of books at home, whether there is classical literature at 
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out that the educational background does not vary systematically between the two kinds of 
states. To control for the impact of family structures, we include the percentage of children 
living with single parents, which is about 28 percent in both types of states. 
 
Table 4: Description of covariates (prior to matching), weighted. 
Full Sample  Lower Secondary Schools   
Mean Non-CEE  Mean CEE  Mean Non-CEE  Mean CEE 
Boy  0.488 0.488 0.514 0.512 
Age 15.284  15.226  15.412  15.279 
Single  parent  0.279 0.282 0.270 0.293 
Parent's  educ:low  0.301 0.283 0.390 0.352 
Parent's  educ:medium  0.438 0.457 0.467 0.495 
Parent's  educ:high  0.261 0.260 0.143 0.153 
Books:  0-10  0.069 0.056 0.100 0.077 
Books:  11-50  0.190 0.188 0.248 0.237 
Books:  51-100  0.219 0.230 0.256 0.267 
Books:  101-250  0.223 0.239 0.210 0.224 
Books:  251-500  0.171 0.169 0.111 0.122 
Books:  500+  0.128 0.118 0.075 0.073 
Classic Literature  0.428 0.466 0.298 0.353 
Read to child: never  0.030  0.020  0.040  0.025 
Read to child: rarely  0.078  0.069  0.092  0.088 
Read to child: once/month  0.079  0.084  0.094  0.101 
Read to child: once/week  0.297  0.329  0.319  0.355 
Read to child: daily  0.517  0.498  0.454  0.431 
Speaks no German at home  0.158  0.090  0.199  0.111 
East  0.091 0.398 0.039 0.397 
East*No  German  0.002 0.012 0.001 0.015 
Hauptschule  0.224 0.244 0.424 0.361 
Realschule  0.305 0.433 0.576 0.639 
Gymnasium 0.319  0.314     
Gesamtschule 0.151  0.010     
East*Hauptschule  0.006 0.039 0.012 0.057 
East*Realschule  0.014 0.230 0.027 0.339 
East*Gymnasium 0.028  0.122    
East*Gesamtschule 0.042  0.007     
N 12,416  11,193  6,507  6,946 
 
 
4. The empirical model and the results 
In the following we estimate the effect of external standards on teacher quality. Using 
German PISA data, the most basic approach to identify the causal effect of CEE on student 
achievement would seem to estimate simple differences between average achievement in CEE 
states and non-CEE states, controlling for student background and other variables of interest. 
Simple differences, however, have only limited value because they ignore a potentially 
confounding effect: the endogeneity of CEEs because of self-selection. 
Although it cannot be ruled out completely that parents vote with their feet and move 
between federal states in order to send their children to schools with or without a central exit 
examination, this seems to be rather unlikely. We therefore assume that the treatment status is 
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institutions can change. The existence of CEEs might reflect unobserved variables such as the 
electorate's preferences for education, that is parental attitudes towards education and 
achievement in school. When CEEs are correlated with such attitudes, simple differences 
between CEE and non-CEE states are a biased measure of the CEE effect. 
The attempt to estimate the causal effect of CEE is subject to the fundamental problem 
of causal inference, namely that it is impossible to observe the individual treatment effect 
(Holland, 1986). One cannot observe the same student at the same time as being student in a 
state with and without CEE. 
In the present paper, we estimate the causal effect of CEEs using an econometric 
matching estimator. Matching estimators have recently gained much attention in the labor 
market literature, in particular in the context of program evaluation (for overviews see e.g. 
Heckman et al. (1998) or Blundell and Costa Dias (2000)). They provide an alternative to 
instrumental variables when there are no good or convincing instruments. Every attempt to 
identify causal effects must make use of generally untestable assumptions. In the case of 
matching estimators the assumption is that the selection into a treatment is completely 
determined by observable variables and that given the observable variables the selection into 
the treatment is random (unconfoundedness assumption). Provided that the unconfoundedness 
assumption holds, we can interpret the assignment of students into CEE and non-CEE states 
as a randomized experiment (given all observed characteristics), which in turn enables us to 
identify causal effects of external standards. The simplest form of matching proceeds as 
follows: For each combination of student characteristics compare the quality of teachers in 
non-CEE states (the controls). Then compute some average difference with respect to the joint 
distribution of student characteristics. Of course, the larger the number of variables and the 
larger the number of possible values, the higher the probability of not having a non-CEE 
student to compare to a CEE student or vice versa. One solution to this dimensionality 
problem is to condition the comparison on the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983), which is just the conditional probability of receiving the treatment given the pre-
treatment variables. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that when the selection into 
treatment is random given the observables, it is also unconfounded given the propensity score. 
It is thus possible to compute treatment effects conditional on a one-dimensional index. 
Still, when the variables are of high dimensionality, it is often not possible to find 
members of the treatment group and of the control group with exactly the same propensity 
score. In order to make propensity score matching feasible, we apply nearest neighbor 
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"nearest" propensity score. 
 
Table 5: Covariate Differences in Matched Samples 
Full Sample  Lower Secondary Schools   
Control Treated  Diff.  t-value Control Treated  Diff.  t-value 
Propensity Score  0.665  0.665  0.000 0.000 0.706 0.706 0.000 0.001 
Boy 0.488  0.480  -0.008  -0.586 0.514 0.509 -0.005 -0.271 
Age 15.215  15.208  -0.007  -0.532 15.266 15.269 0.003  0.174 
Single  parent  0.290 0.298 0.008 0.669 0.293 0.313 0.021 1.185 
Parent's educ:low  0.271  0.281  0.010 0.805 0.357 0.361 0.004 0.219 
Parent's educ:medium  0.446  0.447 0.001 0.048 0.482 0.482 0.000 0.008 
Parent's educ:high  0.283  0.273  -0.010 -0.866 0.161 0.157 -0.004 -0.287 
Books:  0-10  0.057 0.057 0.000 0.054 0.077 0.083 0.006 0.676 
Books:  11-50  0.196 0.199 0.003 0.256 0.253 0.255 0.002 0.119 
Books: 51-100  0.248  0.234  -0.014  -1.154 0.275 0.271 -0.003 -0.202 
Books:  101-250  0.226 0.238 0.012 1.070 0.223 0.217 -0.006  -0.368 
Books: 251-500  0.165  0.161  -0.004  -0.410 0.107 0.109 0.002 0.177 
Books:  500+  0.108 0.111 0.003 0.347 0.065 0.065 -0.001  -0.058 
Classic Literature  0.497  0.495  -0.002 -0.129 0.394 0.380 -0.013 -0.704 
Read to child: never  0.015  0.016 0.001 0.303 0.015 0.019 0.004 1.109 
Read to child: rarely  0.063  0.065 0.001 0.207 0.084 0.082 -0.002  -0.245 
Read to child: once/month  0.089  0.087 -0.002 -0.273 0.106 0.107 0.002 0.137 
Read to child: once/week  0.335  0.340 0.005 0.359 0.347 0.368 0.020 1.144 
Read to child: daily  0.498  0.493  -0.005 -0.336 0.448 0.424 -0.023 -1.224 
Speaks no German at home  0.055  0.051 -0.004 -0.629 0.053 0.062 0.010 1.641 
East  0.681 0.688 0.007 0.671 0.722 0.731 0.009 0.697 
East*No German  0.019  0.016  -0.003  -0.692 0.012 0.021 0.009  1.891+ 
Hauptschule  0.150 0.154 0.004 0.425 0.254 0.248 -0.006  -0.454 
Realschule  0.463 0.467 0.004 0.310 0.746 0.752 0.006 0.454 
Gymnasium  0.365  0.358  -0.007  -0.554      
Gesamtschule 0.023  0.022  -0.001  -0.492      
East*Hauptschule  0.070 0.074 0.004 0.468 0.121 0.119 -0.002  -0.141 
East*Realschule 0.376  0.380  0.004 0.252 0.601 0.612 0.011 0.620 
East*Gymnasium  0.217  0.215  -0.001  -0.113      
East*Gesamtschule  0.018 0.019 0.001 0.372         
N  4,042  11,193     2,157  6,946    
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
The variables used to calculate the propensity score are the same covariates as 
described in Table 4. In order to show that the matching procedure has indeed produced a 
balanced sample of treated (CEE) and control (non-CEE) students, we calculate the means of 
all covariates in the matched sample and test whether these are different (see Table 5). First, 
note that the control group in the full sample consists of only 4,042 different non-CEE 
students. Each of these students contributes on average 11,193/4,042 ≈ 2.77 observations to 
the control group. The corresponding number in the lower secondary school sample is 3.22. t-
values in Table 5 account for this fact. Overall, the matching procedure has been quite 
successful in creating a balanced sample. The only notable difference between treatment and 
control group seems to be the proportion of children who do not speak German at home in 
lower secondary school sample. 
The matching estimates are displayed in Table 6. We first comment on the subjective 
quality measures. It turns out that achievement pressure is perceived to be higher in CEE-
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difference is insignificant. In the full sample, teacher support is perceived to be worse in CEE 
states than in non-CEE states. However, when one only looks at the lower secondary schools, 
one gets the opposite – although insignificant – result. In mathematics classes, the disciplinary 
climate is clearly better in CEE states, but that does not hold for German classes. The results 
concerning clarity of instruction are also mixed. Mathematics teachers provide somewhat 
clearer instructions when students will pass a central exam, but the difference to non-CEE 
students is not significant. In contrast to mathematics teachers, German teachers in CEE states 
provide less clear instructions than their colleagues in non-CEE states. 
 
Table 6: Differences between CEE and non-CEE states, nearest neighbor matching estimates 
  Full Sample  Lower Secondary Schools 
 
Mathematics 
mean CEE minus 
mean non-CEE 
t-value difference mean CEE minus 
mean non-CEE 
t-value difference
achievement pressure  0.087  3.009**  0.086  2.107* 
teacher support  -0.048 -1.728+ 0.048  1.227 
bad disciplinary climate  -0.061  -2.276*  -0.093  -2.432* 
clarity  of  instruction  0.031 1.078 0.051 1.304 
excess  demand  -0.021 -0.837 -0.066  -1.699+ 
individual  orientation  0.036 1.302 0.084  2.137* 
repetitive exercises  -0.080  -2.978**  -0.106  -2.570* 
innovative  exercises  0.006 0.196 0.066 1.565 
mathematics score 1  0.076  2.185*  0.191  4.072** 
mathematics score 2  0.066  1.910+  0.181  4.078** 
German        . 
achievement pressure  0.061  2.329*  0.050  1.378 
teacher support  -0.051 -1.989+ 0.031  0.840 
bad disciplinary climate  0.006  0.229  -0.016  -0.399 
Clarity  -0.055 -2.138* -0.034  -0.935 
excess  demand  -0.014 -0.525 -0.011 -0.312 
individual  orientation  0.030 1.164 0.011 0.293 
reading score 1  0.113  4.313*  0.184  4.939** 
reading score 2  0.110  4.270*  0.176  4.974** 
Parent's General Assessment        . 
school's academic level  0.186 7.249** 0.231 6.351** 
Teachers' efforts  -0.100  -3.812** -0.099  -2.565* 
overall satisfaction with school  -0.072  -2.664**  -0.075  -1.898+ 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Demands are perceived as somewhat less excessive in CEE states, but the difference is 
significant only in lower secondary schools' mathematics classes. Teachers in CEE states are 
generally more oriented towards individual achievement, that is they show interest in and 
support the progress of all students, independent of their abilities. The difference is strongest 
for mathematics teachers in lower secondary schools. 
Critics of central exams often claim that students are taught to the test. If that were the 
case in Germany, one would expect more repetitions, in particular of exercises relevant for the 
  18central exam. However, this seems not to be the case, since mathematics exercises are 
perceived as less repetitive and more innovative in CEE-states. 
Let us finally turn to the parents' view. Parents in CEE states are more likely to say 
that the academic level of their children's school is too high. At the same time they are less 
satisfied both with the teachers' effort and the school in general. This result is difficult to 
interpret. The students' reports of the teachers' behavior suggest that, overall, at least 
mathematics teachers in CEE-states are better teachers. It is possible that this has only a small 
effect on the parents' judgement which relates to teachers of all subjects. It might also be 
possible that parents in CEE states have higher expectations, independent of their observable 
characteristics that were used to balance our sample. 
  The indicators of teacher quality discussed so far are subjective measures. A more 
objective though indirect measure of quality is the level of academic achievement itself, 
measured by the performance in PISA-E. First note that in the full sample all estimates are 
positive and significant. Thus, the causal effect of central exit exams is positive. We conclude 
that students in CEE states perform better because of external standards that are enforced by 
central exit exams. The qualitative results confirm earlier studies by Jürges et al. (2003) and 
Wößmann (2002). Second, effects in lower secondary schools are stronger than the average. 
Given the fact that lower secondary students will pass their exam within a shorter period than 
the average, this result is consistent with the idea that the effect of central exams is stronger 
when the exams are in the near future. Third, we consider the size of the estimated CEE 
effect. Size effects are usually reported in terms of school year equivalents. This is not 
possible with our sample of 9
th graders. Instead, we compare the raw differences in the 
average scores in Table 3 to the matching estimator in Table 6 to show how much of the raw 
difference in the performance can be attributed central exit exams In the full sample, the 
estimated effect of CEEs on the mathematics score is less than half the size of the raw 
difference in the mean scores, while the matching estimate for the reading score difference is 
about 80 percent of the raw difference. In the lower secondary school sample, the estimated 
effect is even larger than the raw difference. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The paper has made two contributions to the literature on teacher quality. First we 
argue that it is optimal to reward teachers depending on the absolute and relative academic 
achievement of students, because this raises the (unobservable) effort of teachers and 
efficiency. This is true even if the pay (in monetary terms) is not performance related. If 
  19teachers value reputation, they increase effort if the output of teaching – academic 
achievement of the students – is measured and published. Consequently, academic 
achievement of students has to be tested centrally and to be made comparable by using a 
benchmark. The reward mechanism works best if the benchmark is chosen carefully, 
controlling for observables like the socio-economic background of the school or the students. 
Thus, central exams are always expected to yield efficiency gains. If the results are made 
comparable based on intelligent benchmarks, the positive effects are getting stronger. 
Second, we used the German PISA-E data to test whether teacher quality is higher 
when academic achievement of students is evaluated according to a central standard. One 
particularity of the German schooling system is its federal structure. Some federal states test 
standards centrally whereas others do not. Another characteristic is the uniform, performance 
independent pay of German teachers. Our matching estimates suggest that, despite the flat 
career profile of German teachers, the quality of teaching tends to be in fact higher in federal 
states with CEEs. We explain this finding explained by teachers’ response to non-monetary 
rewards like reputation. Only CEE states provide the necessary comparable measurement of 
the academic achievement of students and hence teachers’ effort. 
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Table A1: Items used to generate teacher effort indices 
Student variables   
Achievement pressure  The teacher wants students to work hard. 
The teacher tells students that they can do better. 
The teacher does not like it when students deliver sloppy work. 
Teacher support  The teacher shows an interest in every student’s learning. 
The teacher gives students an opportunity to express opinions. 
The teacher helps students with their work. 
The teacher continues teaching until the students understand. 
The teacher does a lot to help students. 
The teacher helps students with their learning. 
[Mathematics only:] The teacher gives helpful advice for my work 
Bad disciplinary climate  The teacher has to wait a long time for students to quiet down. 
Students cannot work well. 
Students don’t listen to what the teacher says. 
Students don’t start working for a long time after the lesson begins. 
There is noise and disorder. 
At the start of class, more than five minutes are spent doing nothing. 
Clarity  The teacher gives clear instructions what to do 
Everything that we do is well planned 
There are specific rules that we must adhere to 
The teacher tells us at the beginning of the lesson what to do 
The teacher summarizes what was done in the previous lesson 
Excess demand  Time is too short to finish my work 
The things we do are too difficult for me 
The teacher tells us things that I do not understand 
You stop listening because you do not understand anything 
Individual orientation  Our teacher acknowledges improvements even if students are below average 
When I really make an effort, the teacher commends me even if others are still better than me 
Our teacher also commends weak students when they make improvements. 
Repetitive exercises  We make little progress because we repeat so much 
We always do the same exercises 
Innovative exercises  By some of our exercises, you can really see if you have understood the topic 
We often apply what we learn to new topics 
You have to pay close attention because the exercises are similar but always a bit different 
Parent variables   
School's academic level  How do you rate the academic level of your child's school – far too low, too low, about right, 
too high or far too high? 
Teachers' efforts  How much do teachers exert themselves for their students – not at all, a little bit, somewhat, 
much, or very much? 
Overall satisfaction with 
school 
How satisfied are you with your child's school – very dissatisfied, dissatisfied, neither 
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